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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the efficacy of various types of auction
formats in dealing with the current glut of foreclosed,
repossessed real estate held by financial institutions and
government in the United States. The background of the current
real estate crisis is traced with particular attention paid to
the plight of American lenders. Precedents for dealing with
repossessed real estate are examined, and lessons from past
crises of 1973-74 and 1981-82 are cited.
A brief look at various auction formats, especially in other
capital markets in the United States, is used to illustrate the
shortcomings of marketing real estate through judicial sales
such as foreclosure auctions. An analysis of successful
auctioning techniques in financial markets gives important clues
to successful marketing of real estate, and especially REO
(repossessed "Real Estate Owned" by financial institutions).
This thesis posits that real estate auction performance always
reflects an "informationdiscount" when product information is
withheld, and only when product information is as fully
disseminated as in a conventional sales arrangement does the
market value real property correctly, regardless of auction
format.
A major condominium auction using the new approach of saturation
of product information and liberal financing is used as a case
study. Auction results are compared to the results of
conventional brokered selling. The success demonstrated in the
case implies that real estate auctions are a viable technique
for selling a large volume of real estate quickly.
Thesis Supervisor: Thomas A. Steele III
Title: Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Dedicated to the Roman sage who observed that,
in the final analysis,
"Res tantum valet quantum vendi potest. "
("A thing is worth how much someone will pay for it.")
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OVERVIEW
The decade of the 1980s was one of tremendous growth in
real estate development in the United States. The excesses
of the decade, of poorly-planned and speculative development
and the concomitant explosion of real estate financing has led
to a well-documented avalanche of problem and distressed
properties in the early 1990s. Real estate which is
repossessed by the lending community is not a new phenomenon.
The Great Depression was marked by waves of foreclosures, as
were the last major postwar recessions of 1973-74 and 1981-
82. The current crisis is distinguished by both its enormous
scope as well as by the unprecedented role of government as
owner of repossessed properties, which commercial banks
commonly refer to as REO (Real Estate Owned, or ORE - Other
Real Estate - by Savings and Loans).
The evolution of the problems of the Savings and Loan
industry as well as the difficulties of many commercial banks
was met by a reactive, rather than proactive, regulatory
response from the federal government.1 The best efforts of
the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to reconcile the respective
problems of the thrift and banking industries have resulted
in a still-growing stockpile of properties held by the
government. In addition, there is a large and growing backlog
of foreclosed properties held by institutions in varying
degrees of financial health. The possible REO represented by
the amount of delinquent and nonperforming loans
collateralized by real property is far greater than REO
properties currently in inventory. Banks currently have more
than $22 billion in REO nationally, and $77.6 billion in non-
performing loans at year-end 1990.2 Federal regulators
estimate that over half of the nonperfoming loans,
collateralized by real estate, could become REO in the next
few years.3 The RTC currently has between $17 and $23 billion
in REO and approximately the same amount of non-performing
loans. Some regulators estimate the amount of REO could
double in twelve to eighteen months.4
In the face of this huge and mounting inventory of REO,
there have been few successful efforts at liquidation. Indeed
the rate of disposition has been far outstripped by the rate
of growth of REO inventory. The logical conclusion is that
both the private sector as well as the federal government are
putting off an inevitable day of reckoning. The time will
come when the REO overhang must be put to market. The sheer
volume of product to be liquidated will necessitate using
marketing methods which can effectively move large blocks of
product in a short period of time.
Chapter II traces the growth of repossessed real estate
in the United States in the 1980s. The history and evolution
of the problem is well-documented in the popular press. The
issue can be seen in light of several different macroeconomic
factors which have received less popular attention than the
celebrated Savings and Loan and regulatory debacle.
Chapter II also examines some important historical
precedents for REO disposition, first following the oil
embargo recession and REIT crisis of the mid-1970s and later
following the recession of 1981-82. The current crisis in REO
is different, however, and best explained by the scientific
concept of critical mass: when the rate of quantitative growth
in a substance (in this case, REO) makes for a qualitative
change in it. This chapter shows why the problem of REO
inventory is still building and why current rates of
disposition are leading to a massive overhang of REO above
the real estate market. It is a problem of unprecedented size
and character that will require innovative and thoughtful
approaches to resolution.
Chapter III offers background on the various types of
auctions formats in general. At first observation, auctions
seem to permeate nearly all economic life in free economies.
Auctions in one form or another are used as a marketing
mechanism for all types of assets. Whether assets are unique
(or ubiquitous!!) and rare, as in the case of art and
antiques, or uniform and identical, as in the case of most
commodities, auctioning is a widely accepted and successful
method of sale. Assets that are perishable, such as tobacco
or freshly cut flowers, are auctioned as readily as durable
goods, such as used automobiles and farm equipment. Real
assets are auctioned as freely as securitized paper assets;
cattle and other livestock come under the hammer while
livestock futures are traded through a somewhat different, if
nevertheless identifiable, auction process. Many times
services are effectively auctioned off, as in the case of bids
on construction or consulting contracts.
Chapter III also discusses auction techniques in American
capital markets other than real estate. The various capital
markets in the United States and abroad rely on varying styles
of auctioning to insure a continuous, liquid marketplace for
each type of asset. The equity markets are the most notable
example. Importantly, the stock exchanges make a centralized,
secondary market in equity securities, while the primary
market for the new issues of those securities is made in an
over-the-counter fashion, through networks of independent
broker-dealers. In the government debt markets, the auction
process assumes a reversed role. The primary market for
securities is through a form of sealed bid auction, while the
active secondary market is not centralized, but is a
"telephone" market of dealers who inventory the securities and
provide liquidity by brokering transactions as well as by
making bids and offers for their own account and risk.
The study of auctioning in securities markets offers some
useful insights into the pros and cons of auctioning real
property. An overview of the various permutations of
auctioning capital assets in these markets highlights the
similarities between auctioning of paper and real assets, and
also reveals important differences between the two markets.
Both similarities and differences point to important
implications for the success of real estate auctions. Chapter
III briefly examines the role auctioning plays in other
capital markets, outlines the parallels with real estate
auctioning as well as some critical distinctions, and shows
some important implications for the process.
Currently there are abundant myths and misconceptions
within the real estate and financial communities concerning
the auctioning of real property. There is widespread popular
feeling that auctions simply don't work in real estate, that
they are somehow an inherently faulty marketing mechanism that
don't achieve "true" market values for real property. The
controversy over valuation is a clear sign of the economic
times. The 1990s is an era when holders of REO will suffer
painful losses even when they liquidate at an appraised value
or other current "fair" market value. Nonetheless, if any
form of auction is considered an intrinsically flawed
methodology when applied to real assets, it opens the question
as to why auction methods of marketing are accepted as the
sine qua non for trading in other capital assets, such as
government and private debt obligations, equity shares,
derivative securites, and other paper assets.
Chapter IV outlines the prerequisites for a real estate
auction format which satisfies all basic conditions for
"making" a marketplace in a free market. First, it begins by
examining the role of real estate auctions in other countries,
where the concept has a history of more substantive
accomplishments. In England and Scotland property auctions
are commonplace. In some areas of Australia auctions are the
preferred method of marketing for upscale residential
properties. In other countries around the world, properties
of unique character and appeal find their way to competitive
auction.
Chapter V is a case study of a condominium auction in
which the market-making requirements of Chapter IV are
employed. Auction results are compared to the previous two
years sales under conventional brokerage. Various scenarios
for market recovery and improved sales through brokers are
evaluated.
Chapter VI summarizes the paper and offers
recommendations for users of real estate auctions in the
future.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER I
1. See Lowell S. Bryan, "A Blueprint for Financial
Reconstruction," Harvard Business Review, May-June 1991:73-86 for
a more detailed discussion.
2. Ron Suskind, "Banks are resorting to Gimmicks to Sell
Foreclosed Real Estate," The Wall Street Journal, 30 May 1991.
3. Ibid.
4. Karen M. Flynn, Liquidation Specialist, FDIC, Washington, D.C.,
telephone conversation with author, 24 July 1991.
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CHAPTER II: THE GROWTH OF REPOSSESSED REAL ESTATE IN THE
1980s
A. ORIGINS AND DIMENSIONS OF THE CURRENT PROBLEM
The 1980s were a time of unprecedented real estate
activity in the United States. A confluence of factors came
together in the early years of the decade to make for an
extraordinary boom in real estate, to be followed later by an
equally extraordinary period of crisis.
The Savings and Loan story of the 1980s constitutes one
of the most widely-followed financial debacles of all time,
perhaps second only to the 1929 stock market crash which in
part marked the beginning of the Great Depression.
Nevertheless, the boom and bust of the Savings and Loan
industry was part of a larger trend towards more aggressive
real estate lending by the U.S. financial community as a whole
in the 1980s. The end result of such aggressive financing is
a huge amount of troubled loans and growing glut of
repossessed real estate in the United States. This glut poses
substantial dangers to the health of the U.S. financial system
and could act as a drug on American economic expansion in the
1990s.
Other major factors which fueled the current crisis were
the phenomenon of tax-driven real estate investing; the pent-
up demand for real estate at the end of the 1981-82 recession;
and substantial speculative building and investing as the bull
market in real estate played itself out. In the end, the
bubble burst, and in its wake came the burgeoning problem of
REO.
B. THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS
The first and most widely-recognized factor which fueled
the real estate boom of the 1980s was the deregulation of the
nation's Savings and Loan industry. Established by the
legislation of the New Deal which compartmentalized financial
institutions by function, the Savings and Loan industry had
long enjoyed a privileged market position in lending to
homeowners during the "baby boom"-induced housing construction
of the post-World War II years. In essence the typical
Savings and Loan held what amounted to a market sinecure
decreed by law. A model Savings and Loan could compete for
deposits at perhaps 5% annually (the allowable ceiling S&Ls
could pay varied, but was set by law), and make first mortgage
loans to homeowners at 7%. For four decades the Savings and
Loan business made steady if unspectacular profits.
The inflation of the 1970s upset the stable economic
environment under which American lenders in general, and the
Savings and Loan industry in particular, had for so long
prospered. The fiscal demands of the Vietnam War resulted in
a series of ever-widening deficits in the American federal
budget and produced substantial inflationary pressures. The
Arab oil embargo of 1973 was the first of the oil price shocks
which continued throughout the decade. By 1980 the price of
crude oil was up over 1000% from the levels of only seven
years earlier. The oil crisis was matched by price explosions
in other commodity markets. The opening of diplomatic ties
to mainland China and detente with the Soviet Union helped
fuel price bubbles in the grain markets: the 1980s saw
soybeans go from under $2 per bushel to over $12 at the height
of the speculative frenzy. The markets in precious metals
also bore testimony to the inflationary pressures of the
decade. Gold and silver gained in value steadily, and went
through wild price gyrations as the 1970s drew to a close.
Nowhere was the high inflation of the 1970s more
manifest, or more portentous for the Savings and Loan
business, than in the money and capital markets. Investors
demanded an inflation premium on their money in addition to
a real return on their assets. The result was to raise the
price of money. When Wall Street introduced vehicles to
capture higher rates for investors such as money market funds,
the Savings and Loans were constrained by law from competing
at market rates for deposits. In the first five years, money
market funds grew from nothing to over $80 billion in
deposits. In addition, the value of the S&L's asset base -
billions of dollars in home mortgages made at the older, low
rates, and contractually fixed for decades - depreciated
dramatically. It appeared it could be only a matter of time
before the Savings and Loan industry as a whole would go
bankrupt.
The government's response to the crisis was a move
towards laissez-faire deregulation. The Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 allowed Savings and Loans
to compete for deposits at the prevailing rate of interest in
the open market. In addition, thrifts were no longer
constrained in the types of loans they could make. They could
compete with commercial banks, REITs, insurance companies,
pension funds, etc. for all types of lending business, and in
particular, for lending to commercial real estate and
development.2
Much attention has been paid to the Achilles Heel of
federal deposit insurance. Federal deposit insurance was
expanded to cover larger amounts of depositors money by the
1982 Act. Had deposit insurance been privatized at that time,
one can only speculate about the implications. If the S&Ls
had pursued the same ruinous underwriting policies while
privately insured, it seems logical that market forces and
therefore market disciplines would have materialized sooner.
Rather than an abundance of delinquent loans and REO in the
early 1990s, the day of reckoning might have come much sooner
for the worst offenders and possibly with less drastic
consequences for the industry as a whole.
By the late 1980s, the Savings and Loan industry was
insolvent. The federal government created the Resolution
Trust Corporation (RTC) in 1989 under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act to take
ailing thrifts into receivership, pay off depositors, sell the
Savings and Loans and dispose of unwanted thrift assets.
Estimates of the total cost of the federal bailout have
reached half a trillion dollars.3 By mid-1991, the RTC had
taken over 617 thrifts and closed nearly 400, but still held
over $160,000,000,000 in thrift assets it had been unable to
sell. The real asset inventory included 1,300 office
buildings, 765 shopping centers, 183 hotels, and 28 golf
courses.4 By May of 1991, the RTC had sold only $17.3 billion
in REO.5
C. OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND REAL ESTATE LENDING
Under an enormous pressure to compete for loans,
commercial banks greatly increased their exposure to real
estate throughout the 1980s. By 1987, real estate lending had
surpassed commercial and consumer lending as the commercial
banks leading source of business.6 Nearly three-quarters of
the growth of commercial bank lending from 1984 to 1989 came
from real estate lending. From well under $100 billion
dollars in 1979,8 commercial bank exposure to commercial real
estate alone was estimated at $385 billion by 1991.9
By the end of 1990, commercial banks carried $77.6
billion in non-performing loans on their books. Federal
regulators estimate that over half that amount were direct
real estate loans, or commercial and consumer loans tied to
real estate. They also estimated that approximately $40
billion of these loans currently on nonperforming status would
become REO. 1 0
The situation of the nation's insurance companies is
somewhat more ambiguous. Since regulation occurs on the state
level, and since mutual insurance companies are not subject
to the reporting requirements of publicly traded corporations,
data is more difficult to obtain. According to the American
Council of Life Insurance, however, American insurance
companies have underwritten approximately $255 billion in real
estate loans as of year-end 1989.11 The industry ratio for
non-performing real estate loans is nearly identical to that
of commercial banks, at 3.4%.12 Direct ownership of real
estate tripled from about $13 billion in 1979 to over $39
billion in 1989. Nevertheless, real estate business as a
percentage of total assets dropped markedly over the same
period, from 30.4% to 22.6%. In essence, it appears that
insurers have less direct exposure to real estate lending than
do the nation's commercial banks, but assessing the quality
of their real estate loan portfolio and other assets is both
anecdotal and problematical. For example, in 1990 the
Equitable Life Assurance Society sold REO valued on its books
at $59.1 million for a $6.7 million dollar loss, despite
insisting that those assets far more than covered any exposure
on the mortgages which these properties had previously
secured.14
D. IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAX POLICY ON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT IN
THE 1980s
The 1980s boom in real estate was in large measure
precipitated by the generous tax treatment accorded real
property by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. This Act
assigned an Accelerated Cost Recovery System of 15 years to
all categories of real estate. In other words, a taxpayer's
investment in a property could be recovered through
depreciation deductions over this arbitrarily determined
recovery period. As first enacted, this ACRS schedule allowed
an investor to write off a full 12% of the depreciable cost
of an investment during the first year.
The overall effect of the 1981 Act was to reward real
estate investment for gross inefficiency. Accelerated
depreciation meant that new development projects could still
hold economic value as tax shelters even if they were devoid
of economic justification as real estate. As a result
projects were often supplied to the real estate market without
disciplined attention to the market's real underlying demand.
Riding the wave of the lending boom fostered by the Savings
and Loans, real estate development exploded.
To compensate for a tax policy which some felt was overly
favorable to the real estate community, Congress enacted the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. This Act nearly doubled the effective
depreciable life of most property, and in so doing, abolished
the heavy tax incentives of real estate investing. For
example, the annual deductions available to a $1 million
depreciable investment over the first fifteen years of its
life went from $1,000,000 under the 1981 Act to only $476,190
under the 1986 Act.15
Many observers of the real estate market felt that such
a drastic reduction in tax benefits was an overreaction on the
part of Congress to a previous inequity in the tax code. The
timing of such a radical change could arguably have been
better, or a more gradual phasing in of new standards might
have been adopted. In any event, the marked diminution of tax
advantages for real estate clearly had the effect of driving
investors from the market. Coinciding with the decline and
fall of the S&L industry, as well as the long economic
expansion of the 1980s, the whipsaw changes in tax policies
further aggravated an already imbalanced real estate market,
and led to the specter of REO in the 1990s.
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E. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS FOR HANDLING REO: THE RECESSIONS
OF 1973-74 AND 1981-82
The past two postwar recessions brought REO problems
which in some respects offer lessons for handling the current
crisis. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, the
last two economic downturns in the U.S. produced substantial
real estate problems for lenders, although not on the current
scale. A twenty-year record for percentage of residential
mortgages in foreclosure was set in the third quarter of 1973,
at 0.52% (commercial data was unavailable). This record was
eclipsed in the fourth quarter of 1982, when 0.67% of home
loans went to foreclosure nationally.16
In relative terms, the past two crises exhibited
similarities with today's troubles. Bank of Boston officials
have been quick to point out that approximately the same
proportion of its loans were in the problem category in the
mid-1970s as there are today, while regulators insist on loan-
loss reserves which are 400% greater.'7
In absolute terms, however, the explosion in real estate
lending has meant that the scope of today's problem poses far
greater dangers both to individual institutions and to the
economy as a whole than do the difficulties of past
recessions. Lenders owned foreclosed properties on a much
smaller scale in the past two recessions. Real estate loans
simply comprised a much smaller percentage of total lending.
REO was typically considered either an embarassment, a
nuisance, or both. In the current environment, how well or
poorly an institution resolves its troubled loans and REO may
determine its financial destiny.
A review of past REO practices is revealing for what it
shows as well as for that which it does not. There are heavy
psychological burdens associated with handling REO, and strong
non-economic considerations often impact what is otherwise a
strict business decision. The unwillingness of organizations
to face unpleasant realities, and the inability to draw on
past experiences are two of the major impediments towards
handling repossessed real estate.
First and foremost, lenders typically seem to work in a
strictly reactive (rather than proactive) mode in dealing with
foreclosures and the concomitant REO. In a 1983 study of
foreclosure and REO practices in California, for example, 55%
of the institutional lenders surveyed "admitted that they did
not keep accurate records of foreclosures in the three major
categories of filing the notice, entering the auction period,
and completing the foreclosure. "18  The author of the study
interpreted this as evidence of the suddenness and severity
of the REO phenomenon, catching lenders off-guard and ill-
prepared for a major crisis. 19 If lenders were overwhelmed by
the last two times of troubles, one can imagine the chaos
attending the current situation.
The author of the California study garnered two major
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impressions from the extensive interviews with institutional
lenders. First, despite the experience of the previous
recession which had ended only six years before, "it was clear
that in almost every company [out of 44 interviewed] questions
and issues were being raised for the first time. . . "20 While
this would indicate a disquieting lack of confidence in the
willingness of lenders to call upon past experience, the
second observation is one that is repeatedly corroborated by
other REO experts. "The general impression was that most
respondents were ill at ease in quantifying their experiences,
and much preferred the anecdotal process. " This observation
could equally apply to calculating the costs of carrying
repossessed real estate (see Chapter V).
The observations of auctioneers who were centrally
involved in the real estate collapse in Texas in the mid-1980s
strongly reinforces the above statements. According to one,
"the biggest problem in dealing with a foreclosure or REO is
getting the bank to admit that there is a problem in the first
place. The denial is tremendous."22 Another said, "In Texas
we saw banks go through the whole cycle again and again.
First they would drag their feet in foreclosing; then they
would buy the property back at the foreclosure sale; then they
would fool around with it for six months or a year, trying to
market it and throwing good money after bad - all the while
the market's going down and they're waiting for it to come
back - finally they'd call us for an REO auction, and they'd
take a lot less than they'd have gotten if they'd gone to a
serious sale in the first place. They would only go to
auction after they'd been bled white and were sick of fooling
around with it."23
Over the past several years in New England, a similar
pattern of denial has been obvious. The author repeatedly
encountered banks who adopted the posture of "we don't have
much in the way of foreclosures or REO, unlike the other banks
in the area;" many times these were the same institutions
later placed under federal receivership. While denying the
existence of problems in a loan portfolio may be explained by
individual or corporate ego, the denial of market conditions
in general seems dangerous. In moments of candor, several
Boston area bank loan officers have indicated that their bank
would be concerned that an auction would call public attention
to the fact that the bank had made a mistake in its
underwriting. Concerns over corporate image simply outweighed
economics. In sum, there are strong non-economic reasons
which historically have precluded more expiditious disposal
of bank REO.
These actions reflect a pattern of bear market behavoir
which may be familiar to students of the stock market and
social psychology. Many market participants hold their
depreciating assets through a declining market, clinging to
hope and believing recovery and rescue are just around the
corner. As prices decline further and pressure mounts, many
owners of assets can not or will not hold on, and panic
selling may set in and lead to dumping at the bottom. Whether
stock market behavoir is directly analogous to real estate
markets in beyond the purview of this study, but the parallels
are clear.
F. THE ROLE OF SELLER FINANCING IN PAST REO DISPOSITIONS
Auctioning of REO in the past two recessions played an
occasional rather than central role. The typical REO
marketing method was to simply list property with a local
broker who had specialized knowledge of either the property,
the local environment, or both. In other instances banks
could discreetly pursue private transactions, perhaps by
approaching privileged clients. According to the California
study, when REO finally did reach the disposition stage, the
consistent feature of transactions was attractive seller
financing. 24
Lenders consistently indicated that while they were not
forced to take deep discounts on the REO holdings after the
1981-82 recession, in many cases they offered below-market
financing as an inducement to buyers to take property off
their books. A full two-thirds of the institutional lenders
surveyed admitted offering mortgages at below-market interest
rates to entice buyers, with almost half of all REO loans
being granted at below-market rates.25
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"The general range of concessions to move foreclosed
properties was to offer the property at a definite 5 to 10
percent below market, as determined by an accurate competitive
market analysis. . .and at a reduced loan rate [amount
unspecified] with a 90% loan-to-value ratio. . ."26 The
mortgages on lender REO property were fixed-rate in an
estimated 95% of the cases (at a time of record high interest
rates, following the greatest increases of interest rates in
American history). There were also substantial indications
that many lenders would refinance a buyer's other properties
in order to raise the down payment. By taking a blanket
mortgage on other real estate, lenders effectively granted
100% financing on their REO.
The contrast between the liberal financing of REO in the
past, and the strangulation of credit on REO in the current
environment, is striking. Lenders in New England have been
instructed by regulators that unless REO is sold at market
rates of interest, it effectively must remain on their books
as REO.
G. THE CURRENT REO CRISIS: WHY THE PROBLEM IS SO SEVERE AND
LIKELY TO GROW IN THE 1990s
One of the hallmarks of troubled loans is the great lag
time between the first signs of trouble and the eventual
foreclosure and designation as REO. Even when a lending
institution has the foresight to confront unpleasant issues
directly, the mechanics of loan workout and foreclosure can
be quite time-consuming.
Once a loan becomes delinquent and is identified as a
problem, the typical lender takes it from the original loan
officer and puts it under the scrutiny of a special department
for Controlled Loans or Workouts. The workout period can be
of varying length. Either a refinance or other ameliorative
plan is devised, or the loan continues delinquent and heads
into foreclosure.
Depending upon the legal requirements for foreclosure in
a given state, as well as the judicial backlog prevailing, a
foreclosure can reach auction in as little as one month or as
many as twelve. Typically this is a period when no payments
are being made by the borrower; interest accrues and costs
associated with loan collection multiply. Eventually the sale
comes to public auction. As the foreclosure auction nears,
many borrowers opt to file a petition for bankruptcy in
federal court in an effort to forestall the auction. At this
juncture the foreclosure may be delayed, or cancelled
altogether, as the borrower's assets come under the purview
of the bankruptcy court. In either case interest and costs
grow.
On the other hand, many times borrowers are not
adversarial in temperament. In these cases, a lender may find
its borrowers simply capitulate in the face of overwhelming
economics, and tender the deed to their collateral over to the
lender in lieu of foreclosure.
A property at foreclosure auction stands little chance
of sale to a third party. Estimates of success at foreclosure
sales nationwide vary wildly. Many industry observers
estimate that no more than 10% of all foreclosure sales result
in a sale to a party other than the borrower or the lender.
In all other cases the lender "bids in" the amount of the note
outstanding. The property becomes an asset of the bank and
carried on its books as REO - Real Estate Owned (occasionally
OREO, "Other" Real Estate Owned, to distinguish from bank
facilities used to conduct business).
What passes to the casual observer as an attempt to bring
a property to market is really nothing of the kind. In
reality foreclosure auctions are no more than a legal or
administrative mechanism which allows the lender to get
control of a defaulted loan's collateral. The prospects for
sale at foreclosure are limited by the legal constraints of
the process. A foreclosing lienholder does not enjoy title
to the property in question, and therefore generally cannot
offer an inspection to prospective buyers. The lender's file
information on the property may be sparse, and data on
property condition may be completely unavailable. No less
debilitating is the lack of flexibility in the terms of sale
which are often imposed by statute. Deposits are set
arbitrarily by the foreclosing lienholder, and can be quite
high, with no contingencies to protect potential buyers.
Settlement date is imposed by law, and can be as quick as 21
days after the sale. Although a lender is not prohibited from
offering financing to qualified bidders, many do not, either
due to inertia or a fear of possible lender liability. In
sum, foreclosure sales must adhere to strict legal guidelines
which are often counter to the necessary elements of
successful selling.
Lenders work under various accounting and bookkeeping
conventions which basically discourage early treatment of
problem loans. Banks and thrifts must maintain minimal
capital requirements in the range of 3-6% of total assets.
When a loan goes to foreclosure, it must be written down to
a current "fair market" value, and the difference this value
and the indebtedness must be booked as a loss, which is a
dollar-for-dollar charge against capital. However, when a
loan is restructured in an effort to avoid an eventual
foreclosure, no loss is booked, and there is no diminution of
capital.a There is a great incentive for lenders to delay in
facing problems in a forthright manner, and thereby avoid an
economic judgment day.
The inevitable by-product of these processes is the
passage of time. It is not unusual for a troubled loan to
take two to three years to reach REO status from the time
payments are at first delinquent. What is inconvenience or
nuisance on the micro level can become economic disaster on
the macro. When a region's economy heads into a tailspin, a
lender can go from having a minimum of delinquent loans to
having several hundred properties headed to foreclosure within
a short period of time. When a region experiences sharp
economic contraction, all lenders can feel the pressure. It
is pressure that can be years in building and take years to
resolve.
The response of individual lenders on the micro scale is
demonstrably slow and reactionary. By the same token, the
response of the regulatory authorities to the growing crisis
of the 1980s was slow, reactive, and inadequate. Most
importantly, the regulatory approach of both the RTC and the
FDIC has resulted in a growing stockpile of government-owned
REO.
The standard approach of the RTC has been to meld a
failed institution with a healthy one. The "good" institution
will typically take the performing loans and other assets of
the failed S&L, and reject assets it does not want. The RTC
becomes the owner of the unwanted assets at their previous
book value. The difference between proceeds realized from
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sale of assets and liabilities to depositors is appropriated
by Congress.
Determining the total dollar volume of repossessed real
estate which must be resolved in the 1990s is at best
guesswork. Adding the REO currently held in inventory by the
healthy thrifts and commercial banks yields a number well in
excess of $50 billion. Adding the repossessed asset inventory
held by the Resolution Trust, and the number approaches $200
billion, with perhaps $60 billion in Texas alone.30 Add the
plight of the insurance companies, and the inevitable
evolution of nonperforming loans into Real Estate Owned from
thrifts and commercial banks, and the total could double.
Finally, the growth in public and private REO could be
tremendously increased by a prolonged recession, lackluster
growth in an expanding economy, higher interest rates, or a
"stagflationary" environment in the early 1990s. To guage the
total magnitude of REO which overhangs the American real
estate market involves a good deal of guesswork, but with some
certainty the value of all REO reaches well over one hundred
billion dollars. By comparison, the value of new homes built
in an average year in the United States is a similar amount.
H. DRAWBACKS AND INADEQUACIES OF THE CURRENT APPROACHES TO
REO RESOLUTION
The problems of REO disposition and ultimate resolution
have been caused by at least three main factors: governmental
agencies (and private financial institutions) overwhelmed by
volume and unsophisticated at the requirements of successful
selling and marketing; fear of "dumping" properties on the
market and exacerbating the downward price spiral; and a
credit crunch coming at a time when liquidity and confidence
are most necessary to move troubled properties.
The suddenness and depth of the REO crisis of the 1990s
have caught many institutions without adequate experienced
staff to handle the incoming caseload of troubled loans and
properties. Lack of trained REO personnel was nowhere more
acute than in the federal government, which had expand the
existing FDIC and create the RTC with great urgency.
I. THE CREDIT CRUNCH AND RELATIONSHIP TO AUCTIONING REO
The new regulatory climate for banks in 1989 brought
sweeping changes, implemented with great speed, and coincided
with the onset of national and global recessions.31
Inevitably the government's actions exacerbated tight credit
market conditions and had the opposite effect of increasing
the lending community's REO. New capital requirements for
banks meant that higher reserves must be set aside for future
loan losses. This new environment finds institutions with
assets of some $70 billion already insolvent and under FDIC
receivership, but "$700 billion in assets. . .controlled by
banks that have insufficient capital to meet regulatory
requirements."32 There are basically two types approaches to
a solution: those that raise capital to support today's level
of assets in banks, and those that advocate shrinking the
asset base to come more in line with available capital. The
two approaches have been termed "liability-based" and "asset-
based" solutions, respectively.
REO is but one type of asset in the larger asset class
which includes both nonperforming and healthy real estate
loans. By definition, REO is an asset that has been written
down, and a loss taken upon it: if the foreclosure had
produced any bid which vaguely approached the total
indebtedness, the property would have been sold and never
reached bank inventory. Sale of REO is predicated upon the
notion that assets can be sold into a liquid market for a
price equal or greater than book value.
The approach of federal regulatory authorities which has
resulted in a real estate credit crunch, especially for REO,
makes for an ironic observation. The government's behavoir
in a stock market crash (really that of the central monetary
authorities, the Federal Reserve) is to provide all the
liquidity necessary, even to step in and be the lender of last
resort, but in any event to make sure that business goes
smoothly forward. In the Great Real Estate Crash of the
1990s, however, the government's actions (predominantly those
of the regulatory agencies of the banking system) have served
to choke off liquidity, through a host of tax, regulatory, and
administrative requirements. The great irony is that the
federal government itself holds the largest "long" position
in the entire real estate market. Although interest rates
have remained mercifully low over the past several years,
current government policy has worked against providing
financing for the real estate which the government itself
owns. Instead of aggressively flooding the market with
liquidity, or at least insuring that adequate financial
lubrication is present in the system, the government is in
reality working against itself.
The current scenario may be analogous to a stock market
crash in which the government held the largest portfolio in
the market: perhaps volatile, high beta stocks, or issues
which once might have seemed high-flying but which now are of
dubious quality. The normal response to a crash would be to
prompt banks to make loans so stockholders could meet margin
calls, but in our example the government would instead dictate
that margin requirements be raised. This would work against
the possibility of selling out of their position into a liquid
environment. Holding real estate - or stocks - implies a
speculation that prices will recover partially or totally, and
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that losses will be cut. (The high cost of carry in real
estate makes such a speculation risky. See Chapter V). In
such a scenario, would holding a huge market position be
considered prudent, or dangerous?
Congress has wisely mandated that property not be dumped
pell-mell upon the market. But if the government's huge
inventory is not steadily "fed" to the market, the overhang
simply builds and pressure for "dumping" grows. Without
liquidity, any substantial amount of federal property sales
could turn into dumping, and potentially be ruinous.
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CHAPTER III. AUCTION MARKETING TECHNIQUES IN OTHER MARKETS
A. APPLICATIONS OF AUCTION THEORY TO REAL ESTATE
There exists a rich and diverse literature on auction
theory. The first and most obvious drawback to the entire
body of literature is that the focus is heavily oriented
towards the micro level, which typically examines different
bidding theories, and the issues of an optimal sale of one
item through various auction structures and formats. In
contrast, the challenges of the REO crisis of the 1990s are
on the macro level. The present situation demands moving
large amounts of inventory of a traditionally illiquid capital
asset. Since it is an unprecedented situation there exists
little data on auctions as a market-wide phenomenon which
could serve as a guide.
The second major drawback to auction theory is its
assumption of rational actors who make predetermined
valuations and act according to their preordained strategy
during the bidding process. One of the great advantages to
the English system, at least, is its potential to introduce
a plethora of emotional dimensions to the bidding. Little or
no conventional auction theory accounts for this, although
implications of social psychology on markets has long been
studied in the stock market.
Despite the substantial limits to the insightfulness of
many important auction theories when applied to real estate,
there are a number of worthwhile observations of "micro"
auction theory that are useful. They also make intuitive
sense, are supported by empirical research, and corroborated
if only anecdotally by the best of the real world
practitioners of auctioneering.
First, there is the notion that the prices achieved under
any auction format will be favorably correlated to an
increasing number of bidders. This was shown in a 1987 study
of such diverse markets as tax-exempt bond underwriting,
offshore oil leasing, and National Forest Service Timber
Sales.1 This is especially critical for auctions in certain
real estate sub-markets, such as single-user industrial, where
the market for a specific property may be thin even under
normal circumstances. The number of potential bidders is
related to the effectiveness of advertising an auction event.
It is further strongly related to the out-of-pocket costs of
placing a bid. In the case of required due diligence for
institutional-grade investment property, the substantial costs
to prepare a bid can be a major barrier to entry.
Secondly, certain auctions offer a strong and valuable
price discovery function for real estate similar to that which
is exchanges provide for traded securities. This can occur
when an auction offers a sequence of identical or highly
similar products, such as condominium units in the same
development or buildable house lots in the same subdivision.
In these instances, sales are subject to a "declining price
anomaly"2 in which the first lots fetch the highest prices and
tend to level off with subsequent sales. This can
emphatically demonstrate at what lower price levels greater
market acceptance and deep liquidity begins to occur, and can
prove useful in projecting absorption.3
Auction theory will no doubt make great strides in the
1990s, as there is sure to be a vastly improved body of data
for researchers to work on. Perhaps the richest area for
auction theory is in the area of research on auctions of
upscale residential homes in the United States. Established
auctioneers offer compelling anecdotal evidence that luxury
residences and estates often sell at auction for staggering
premiums over appraised value, and as a result auctions should
be the preferred means of selling high-end homes. Still,
Sotheby's maintains a real estate brokerage division for high-
end homes but doesn't regularly auction them. Perhaps
Sotheby's adds value through excellence of service and not
through innovation.
B. AUCTION FORMATS: ENGLISH, DUTCH, AND SEALED BID
VARIATIONS
English auctions are the most common type and easily
recognizable. A single auctioneer orally "calls" ascending
bids offered by prospective buyers who publicly congregate for
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the sale, and the highest called bid wins when the auctioneer
bangs a hammer or gavel, or otherwise calls an end to the
bidding.4 The most common examples of English auctions are
those for antiques and fine art. Conduct of English
auctioneering is governed by differing state laws throughout
the U.S., all which are remarkable for their brevity. It is
the opinion of the author that English auctions are governed
far more by local customs, mores, and traditions than by
statute. What may be common practice in one locale, or for
one type of good at sale, may be considered dirty pool in
another. Far more than even many sophisticated veterans of
auctions realize, the conduct of a given sale is open to the
creativity and discretion of the auctioneer. The best
examples concern issues of seller's bids, and reserve or
minimum prices.
Seller's bids essentially mean fictitious bids placed by
the auctioneer or a confederate on behalf of the seller. This
technique is controversial for its ethics as well as its
effectiveness. Laws addressing this practice vary from one
country to another, and within the U.S. from one state to
another. Although many auction-goers may feel such activity
is somehow unfair, British law has sanctioned the technique
since at least the "Sale of Land by Auction Act of 1867."5
This law is unclear as to whether this method is acceptable
below the reserve price, above it, or at all times. It only
requires that the auctioneer apprise the public that the
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technique may be applied at a particular sale. The practice
is widespread in the art markets, where paintings or other
goods are often "bid in" or bought by the auction house on
behalf of the seller when third party bids fail to achieve the
seller's reserve (minimum acceptable selling price).
The advantages of seller's bids are substantial in thin
trading such as the current real estate market. A live
English auction can be conducted, and if only one interested
third party bids, then seller's bids can test whether the
third party will pay a price acceptable to the seller.
Knowledgeable implementation of reserve prices and seller
bidding practices would make auctioning far more palatable for
institutional holders of REO in the United States.
A seller's reserve, as mentioned above, is simply the
minimum selling price acceptable to the seller. A reserve is
never made public. Therefore, when known only to the seller
and auctioneer, the reserve amounts to seller's right to
refuse any and all third party bids.
A minimum price is simply a publicized reserve. This
technique is widespread in contemporary real estate auctions.
Any bid over the published minimum must legally be accepted
by the seller.
"Dutch" auctions are conceptually an inversion of the
English approach. This system starts with an unrealistically
high bid, publicly posted by the auctioneer. Then at regular
time intervals the bid is dropped incrementally, usually by
a special clock constructed to show the declining bids with
the sweep of the "second" hand. The first bidder to signal
acceptance, usually by yelling "Mine!", is the buyer.6
The wholesale tulip and flower markets in Aalsmeer,
Holland, actually use the Dutch technique to sell millions of
their perishable commodities daily. In a sense, the
conventional brokerage of real estate in the U.S. is a type
of slow-motion Dutch auction conducted by Realtors. Prices
start high and are reduced monthly (or more, or less
frequently) until the first bidder who "hits" the asking price
becomes the buyer. The main disadvantage to this type of
auction for the market as a whole is that it provides no
consecutive price information. This may be available in terms
of rejected offers, or how many parties viewed a property, but
this is privately held data, and also tends to be much less
sparse than price data from public auctions.
The sealed bid sale is a close theoretical cousin to the
Dutch format. All bidders make a single bid, and submit it
to the auctioneer. Bids are opened and the high bid wins (in
the case of contract bidding the low bid wins). Variations
on the theme include the high bidder winning but at the second
bidder's price, or at some weighted average of the first two,
or even three, bids. Bidding theory and strategies can get
quite complex, as under the other formats. Like the other
approaches the sealed bid technique can be used in conjunction
with a reserve (minimum) price or undergo other permutations.
This system is popular with government sales because of its
ease of implementation, because buyer collusion is difficult,
or perhaps just because failed auctions are kept from the
glare of public scrutiny.
C. AUCTION FORMATS IN CAPITAL MARKETS: SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
ON PROVIDING LIQUIDITY
Auction formats or techniques are used in the marketing
and secondary marketing trading of nearly every capital market
in the United States. A brief look at these markets offers
important clues for successful auctioning of the least liquid
capital market, real property.
Auction-like rules are used to buy and sell all paper
assets. In the primary (new issue) market for U.S. government
debt, a variation of sealed bid approach is used. Once
issued, a decentralized "over-the-counter" market is made by
broker/dealers connected through electronic media. In the
stock market, the reverse is true: only a new issue's
underwriters offer it to clients by telephone or other means,
and once issued it trades on its appropriate exchange under
auction-like conditions. The actual permutations of auction
principles devised by the exchanges make fascinating hybrids
for the theorist: a "double" auction occurs, in which all the
floor brokers can be both buyers and sellers. The specialist
is both an auctioneer, as well as the buyer or seller, the
liquidity provider, of last resort.
The purest example of double auctions occurs on the
futures exchanges, such as the Chicago Board of Trade or
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. On these exchanges there are no
specialists, but each floor broker acts as an auctioneer, as
well as a buyer and seller - and over 700 have been in a
single trading pit at one time.
The greatest lesson for the study of real estate auctions
may oddly enough come from futures trading. Grain exchanges
were able to succeed because they were able to specify just
what they were trading; to identify and standardize the
quality as well as quantity of grain deliverable under a given
futures contract. In this way, a futures contract resembles
any other financial instrument. It is intuitively obvious
that 100 shares of IBM common stock is identical to any other
100 shares, and therefore, there is no economic preference for
either hundred shares. The grain contracts work the same way.
Grains are graded according to clear guidelines strictly
specified in each exchange's contract. That contract is the
source of complete product information for the buyers. At
the moment they place their bids in the particular exchange's
auction market, they know with absolute certainty exactly what
they will be getting at delivery. Buying the Chicago contract
calls for a certain grade and type of grain; the Kansas City
calls for another, the Minneapolis and Canadian exchanges,
still others. The various exchanges, in addition to providing
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the physical facilities for trading, act as the financial
guarantors for the integrity of their respective futures
contracts. So like the IBM stock, there is no product
uncertainty, no iota of product information lacking, at the
moment of bidding. The only uncertainty is that of which
price the buyer's order will be executed at.
It is just this characteristic of fungibility or
substitutability of product that makes liquidity possible in
the financial markets. It is made possible because the
"product risk" is eliminated by complete product information,
guaranteed by the exchanges. The market participants need
only to establish price.
It is central to this thesis that only when a real estate
marketplace satisfies the product information needs of the
market participants, as the art auctions or financial
exchanges do, can liquidity and successful trading of real
property occur. An auction market can value any asset, even
the most unique assets which have few or no direct comparable
substitutes, as the art and antique auctions continually
prove. The implications for real estate auctions are examined
in depth in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER IV. REAL ESTATE AUCTIONS: THE CHALLENGE OF BRINGING
LIQUIDITY TO THE LEAST LIQUID CAPITAL MARKET
A. HISTORICAL & FOREIGN PERSPECTIVES ON REAL ESTATE AUCTIONS
Real estate auctions have a long and colorful history.
The concept goes back to at least Genesis 23, when Abraham
bought the fields of Machpela from Ephron.1 In the second
century A.D. the entire Roman Empire was auctioned off by the
Praetorian Guard to settle a question of imperial succession.2
In more recent times, the practice of auctioning real estate
has largely been confined to distress situations, but even
this has long historical precedent.3
In some areas of the world, auctioning of real estate
plays a market-making role of importance. In late 1989, for
example, a large and coveted block of office space in central
Paris was auctioned off by Citicorp with spectacular results.
The eventual high bidder was a son-in-law of Francois
Mitterand, President of France.4
The methods and successes of other country's auction
systems offer some insights for application of auctions to the
American REO overhang in the near future, as well as the
longer term viability of auctions in real estate over multiple
market cycles. First there is the U.K.: auctions have long
been on the British property scene, and sealed bids have long
played a major role in Scotland. 5 In addition, Australia
relies on auctioneering to market nearly all commercial
properties and much of the residential real estate as well.6
In the British market auctions have a more limited market
share, but British law provides for important buyer
protections. Concerning "Property Inspection and Preparation
of Particulars" for inclusion into the auction catalogue, "in
the last twenty years, the weight of the law generally has
shifted from favouring the seller to protecting the buyer.
In the property field. . .the auctioneer who publishes
incorrect information in his catalogue can. . .be sued for
negligence. The auctioneer cannot rely on printing a
disclaimer in the catalogue. "7  It is this stringent reliance
on information dissemination which makes British auctions
successful.
In some parts of Australia, auctions play a leading if not
dominant role in marketing real estate. Approximately half
of the higher quality residential properties are sold by
English style auction, in which an auctioneer works closely
with the listing real estate broker (estate agent) .8 Real
estate listings are customarily for 60 days only, and the
auction takes place within that time frame.9 Seller reserves
are almost always used but the amount is rarely divulged in
advance. This effectively gives the seller the right to
reject any and all bids.10 Seller bids are not only legal, but
regularly used to raise prices.1 1
Interestingly, Australian auctions are rarely held with
contingencies of any kind, including financing. Auctions are
successful not in spite of an apparent lack of financing, but
rather because the homes auctioned are in the upper-middle
income echelon, and bidders go forward with "an informal
understanding with a lender that a certain percentage of the
purchase price will be provided. "12  Auctions are heavily
skewed towards upper-income people, and loan commitments "may
be associated as much with the borrower's financial capacity
as with the collateral's value. "13 This phenomenon would
substantiate rather than refute the notion that availability
of financing is a prerequisite to conducting a successful
auction.
From 1959 until the late 1980s, auctions greatly gained
in popularity in Australia. One of the most important factors
was the participation and advocacy of the real estate
community itself.14 Unlike the resistance to auctioning
concepts which has marked the American real estate industry,
the Australian industry actively promoted the concept.
Real estate auctions have evolved for selling high
quality and unique properties, 15and in sharp contrast to the
distressed mentality of the United States, "auctions tend to
be used most during periods of high demand and rapidly rising
prices." 16 In one of the few studies performed on auctions
versus conventional negotiated transactions, Kenneth Lusht of
Pennsylvania State University sampled over 300 transactions
in Melbourne from January 1988 to March 1989.17 "Houses listed
for sale by auction and sold either before or at auction
brought a statistically significant price premuium over houses
listed and sold privately. . . "1 Given these results, it is
unclear why there is such resistance to further exploration
of the concept in the United States, or why auctions are
constantly dismissed with tautological explanations on the
order of "auctions don't work in this country because the
market won't accept them."
In the relatively short history of United States
business, most auctions of real property have traditionally
been foreclosures. As such they grew from the demands of
legal necessities, and not for their economic advantages.
Basically, an auction follows the legal acts of loan
acceleration and foreclosure in order to prevent the borrower
from exercising a legal right of redemption. In addition to
the foreclosures of the Great Depression and in each of the
post-World War II recessions, property commonly finds its way
to auction during sales ordered by federal bankruptcy courts,
income tax authorities, municipalities for delinquent property
taxes, and via other judicial or administrative mandates. As
a result, the vast experience of both the general public as
well as the real estate and financial communities has been
with those auctions conducted under legal and bureaucratic
constraints and guidelines, and not for strictly economic
reasons.
B. TOWARDS A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO AUCTIONEERING
OF REAL ESTATE
At the simplest level, a real estate auction is an
attempt to bring the concept of a centralized, liquid
marketplace to an asset or assets which historically have been
both illiquid and sold by an interacting network of
decentralized broker/dealers.
"Since real estate assets are by nature heterogeneous,
real estate auctions can be recognized as a particular form
of a classical market where the number of goods for sale. .
.is equal to one. Hence, the seller enjoys a monopolistic
position in terms of offering a unique asset, but, unlike true
monopolistic goods, close substitutes typically exist with
real estate assets so that the seller is often thought of as
ineffectual at influencing the ultimate sales price." 9 The
authors go on to say that by micro-manipulating the auction
format "through reserve price setting, changing the number of
bidders, choosing an information release policy or
transferring risk. . .the seller can marginally and sometimes
significantly impact the ultimate selling price in
sophisticated ways. . .120
The seller does enjoy one unique monopolistic position
in regard to his or her property: the seller has a unique
access to product information for a product that is inherently
unique. Only when all market participants can share this
access to product information will the market, as embodied in
the auction, have a chance of establishing value, of setting
an optimal or correct price through any auction mechanism.
One of the assumptions gleaned from interviews with
auctioneers is that the particular format for an auction
(English, Dutch, sealed bid, absolute, reserve, minimum bid)
is of secondary importance once the preconditions of
information dissemination and financing for bidders have been
established. This seems in agreement with one of the
cornerstones of academic work on auctions, the "revenue
equivalence theorem"2 1 which states that all methods yield
equal results. An auction firm with a real estate background,
knowledge of a local market (or access to such knowledge
through local correspondents), and adequate competence in
marketing and presentation methods should be able to produce
a satisfactory number of qualified bidders on auction day.
The micro-management of marketing is best left to savvy
marketing professionals, but sellers must take care to
establish the preconditions for the market to evaluate a
property.
Auctions conjure up the specter of "dumping" because most
American sellers treat their real estate as a commodity to be
sold by the pound when it heads for the auction block, and it
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This thesis posits that
real estate auction performance always reflects an
"information discount" when product information is withheld,
and when product information is as fully disseminated as in
a conventional sales arrangement does the market value real
property correctly under any auction format. Without clear
establishment of quality of the product upon delivery, as
there is in the futures and equity markets, real estate
auctions will not function.
Real estate auctioning of non-distress property is
relatively new in the United States, and there are but a
handful of firms versed in the field. It might be said that
in general the real estate people don't understand auctions,
and that precious few auctioneers understand real estate.
So to establish a new, comprehensive approach to real
estate auctioning means that all information necessary to
perform due diligence must be made available by the seller.
Most American auctions are conducted under "AS-IS, WHERE-IS"
conditions, under which prospective buyers must gather their
own information about the property, the vast majority of which
is held in the near-monopoly position by the seller. The
consistent exception to this seller's information monopoly is
the guarantee of clear and marketable title, which by custon
and tradition is a precondition of non-distress sales in the
United States. Such a guaranteee does not preclude a
prospective buyer's counsel from legal investigation of the
chain of title. Interestingly, in the U.K., auctions are
regularly conducted on properties with all sorts of title
imperfections, but information upon those are rigorously
disseminated. It is left for the market to establish the
value of such properties with titles with liens or easements.
Product information goes beyond clear title, and must
reflect everything that is known about a property. The
process of dissemination is incumbent on the seller, but
buyers must be given every opportunity to conduct due
diligence at their own time and expense. Such due diligence
may include, but not be limited to, data on structural,
infrastructure (electricity, water, sewer), metes and bounds,
building condition, maintainence records, engineering and
environmental matters, and so forth. The data which is non-
monopolistic but which the seller is also in a unique position
to provide is that on local, neighborhood, and civic
conditions and politics. What does the fiscal health record
of a state or municipality look like? What is the record of
property tax increases, and special municipal assessments?
What is the character of the community? What is the character
of the local school system (for residential) or labor force
(for commercial/industrial)?
In addition to providing such comprehensive information
to prospective purchasers, the seller must make the properties
available for buyers to inspect and research on their own.
Most auctions have minimal inspection periods; some are for
one hour on the morning of the sale only, and there is no
opportunity for professional inspection by buyer's agents.
A comprehensive approach to auctioneering of real
property is basically to include all that which allows the
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conventional format of brokered selling to succeed, but to
invert the process of events. Although not commonly thought
of as such, in a conventional real estate negotiation the
bargain is basically struck at the beginning of the process.
The price-setting comes first, but it is only a tentative
price, and is strictly based upon the prima facie evidence
which the seller makes available about the property. The
seller establishes an asking price, and the first bidder to
meet it, or whose offer satisfactorily approaches it, puts the
property "under agreement." Most agreements customarily
include contingencies, which may allow the seller to procure
satisfactory financing, but nearly always provide for a period
of due diligence, in which the seller or the seller's expert
agents may investigate the property to establish product
information, or to corroborate that information which the
seller had provided. If the facts unveiled by due diligence
differ substantially from those assumptions upon which the
price had been set, then the final price is arrived at through
more negotiations, or the transaction is cancelled, and
typically deposits are returned. There is no exchange of
economic value.
In a comprehensive approach to auctioneering, the same
events must take place, but in reverse order, and the price-
setting is the very last act embodied in the auction process
itself.
The first and most critical requirement for successful
auctioning in America is for sellers to adopt a policy of
total release of available information. Further, there must
be liberal provision for prospective buyers to conduct general
or specific property inspections. For price to be
established, all due diligence must be performed first, so all
information must be openly disseminated long enough before
price-setting for the auction to take place. The current
practice for inspection at foreclosure and other judicial
sales, if there is one, is for a one or two hour open house
immediately preceding the sale.
The terms of sale must be standardized, so that all
bidders may bid on the same product. Closing dates must be
far enough in advance to allow enough time for those bidders
who choose not to accept the auction-sponsored financing to
arrange funding from other sources. Information and terms
must be clearly addressed to the bidding public before bidding
can take place.
Because the vast majority of sales in American real
estate are predicated upon 75% to 100% financing of the
purchase price, mortgage availability is the second imperative
of a comprehensive auction. To make prospective buyers rely
on cash to close transactions is to limit the number of
bidders at auction. While financing packages sanctioned or
arranged by the auctioneer do not exclude buyers from
arranging their own funding, there is always the possibility
of offering a below-market interest rate or other attractive
terms. Some auctions in the Southwest or Texas even offered
portfolio financing at condominium auctions in which the down
payment - usually no more than 5 to 10 percent of the winning
bid - qualified the bidder for a low fixed-rate mortgage!
Unfortunately precise data is unavailable for the results, but
anecdotal wisdom is that such financing at auction brings
results far superior to any method of marketing. As for the
necessity of offering financing to bidders, at least one
prominent auctioneer believes it adds an average of 10% to 20%
to the final sales price.22
To sum up the comprehensive requirements of
auctioneering, there are two overwhelming factors for success:
- PRODUCT INFORMATION, both positive and that which may
detract from value, must be fully and widely disseminated in
time for prospective buyers or their expert agents to do
general or specialized inspections and investigations on the
property. When the property is put up at the auction block,
the prospective buyers must ideally have as much property-
specific information as they wish. American auctions work
traditionally on an "AS-IS, WHERE-IS" basis, and the seller
provision is for clear and marketable title.
- FINANCING available on the property. Ideally an
attractive financing package should be aggressively offered,
with the easiest credit consistent with good underwriting.
When the broadest possible number of interested bidders have
access to financing, it increases auction participation. When
more bidders compete at an auction, prices tend to be higher.
The proposition is intuitively obvious, and well supported by
research, but the utility of increasing bidder participation
is often lost on novice sellers in practice. They tend to
think only in terms of one bidder making the winning (high)
bid, yet to achieve the upward dynamic of an English auction
"the back bidders [the pool of competing but failed bidders]
are as important as the high bidder."24
In addition to the two major mandates for product
information and financing, there are other considerations
relevant to conducting a successful auction event, but not
exclusive to auctioneering of real estate. The micro-
management of order of sale, format of auction, seller's bid
strategies, clear and coherent terms of sale, smooth and
professional execution of the event, are all matters to be
left to the property's sellers or professional auctioneers and
marketers versed in the nuances of their trades. Such
requirements would not change, however, were the sale for a
commodity other than real property, such as art or wine. At
all times the dictates of good marketing apply, so that a
multiple number of potential interested buyers can be brought
to a central location at an appointed time.
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CHAPTER V. CONVENTIONAL SALES vs. COMPREHENSIVE AUCTION
RESULTS: CASE STUDY OF MARINA POINT CONDOMINIUMS, QUINCY,
MASSACHUSETTS
A. COSTS OF HOLDING REO
For many institutional holders of repossessed real
estate, asset disposition issues are among the most
troublesome business decisions which real estate executives
must face. Many projects, if liquidated at current fair
market prices, will result in a loss to the institution and
ultimately nothing can reverse the unpleasantness of losing
money. Many asset disposition decisions are made for
properties which have a history of failed loan workout
policies, and a project may easily develop a stigma within a
portfolio.
There is understandably great reluctance for institutions
to quantify the total costs associated with owning foreclosed
real estate projects. In essence, REO represents a mistake
which an institution has made, and there is little reason to
think that adding up losses will make for welcome news. The
non-economic costs, as well as the quantifiable costs, of
holding repossessed real estate are always substantial.
The objective of this study is to determine whether
auctions offer an institutional holder of REO a higher net
present value than continuation of conventional sales at their
current pace, or conventional sales at a slightly or
substantially improved pace.
The methodology is to compare actual auction results to
the hypothetical cash flow which would have been obtained from
a linear continuation of the conventional sales pace preceding
the auction until all inventory is sold. To compensate for
the time necessary to complete the conventional sales
campaign, a reliable cost of carry for real estate owned must
be constructed. Once obtained, the cost of carry can be used
to discount the cash flow obtained from the conventional sales
campaign to arrive at a net present value. This calculated
net present value (NPV) can then be directly compared to the
expected value from an auction.
Auction results can also be tested against conventional
sales projections other than those achieved in the most recent
period. To create a "band" of present values, the
implications of a 30% increase in the conventional sales pace
as well as a more optimistic case of a 100% increase in the
conventional sales pace was considered.
Condominium developments as a specific product type were
studied because there is a well-defined pace of brokered sales
which can be extrapolated into the future. The total sales
during the one or two years preceding a liquidation auction
(one which adheres to the precepts of product information and
financing) is averaged by either 12 or 24 months to yield the
number of square feet sold per month, and the average revenues
collected per month. This current absorption pace can then
be extrapolated to yield both the expected cash flow and the
time to sell-out, assuming a steady state.
B. DATA ON BOSTON AREA CONDOMINIUM AUCTIONS
The author examined sales records for seven major
condominium auctions held in the Greater Boston area from late
1989 unitl early 1991. All sales conformed to the product
information and financing requirements for a comprehensive
approach to auctioning real estate. All sales were conducted
by major national real estate auction houses. Data was
examined for the following projects: River Court Condominiums
and The Esplanade Condominiums in Cambridge; 75 Clarendon
Street Condominiums and Fulton Court Condominiums, both in
Boston; Oak Terrace Condominiums in Framingham, Massachusetts;
Emerson Gardens in Lexington, Massachusetts; and Marina Point
Condominiums in Quincy, Massachusetts.
The primary source of available data was the recordings
of deed transfers filed at the various Registries of Deeds in
Suffolk, Middlesex South, and Norfolk Counties. However,
county records of property transfers are arranged
chronologically in the order the individual Registry receives
them. Without knowing the date of transfer of a unit, and
without the specific reference to the Registry book and page
number of a deed, a researcher would need to review each deed
filed in a county for one or two years prior to an auction in
order to extract the record of conventional sales of a
development. Tracking sales from an auction is in practical
terms equally difficult. The relative flurry of transfers
resulting from an auction can be spread over four to eight
weeks after the sale, and the sheer volume of all property
transfers makes it difficult for a thorough search to be
completed. This procedure would need to be completed for each
development studied, and the time necessary for this type of
research exceeded the time available to complete this thesis.
Lacking the time needed to meticulously search county
records, the author turned to secondary sources. The most
widely-used secondary source for property transaction data in
New England is a private service called the Condominium Sales
Report, published both monthly and annually by Banker and
Tradesman.1 Banker and Tradesman compiles sales records from
the deed transfers filed at each Registry in Massachusetts.
It soon became apparent, however, that even the secondary
data was full of inconsistent statistics, and often with a
debilitating lack of detail. Between the monthly and annual
data, there were gross discrepancies between the number of
sales recorded. For instance, the 1990 Condominium Sales
Annual showed 49 sales for the Esplanade, while the 12 monthly
issues for 1990 failed to record a single transaction.
The same inconsistencies surfaced for all other projects.
Fulton Court showed only four sales in the Banker and
Tradesman sources for the twelve months preceding the auction.
A fortuitous meeting with the sales manager of the project led
to the revelation that in fact seven units had changed hands
during that time. In either case the pace of sales was
dismal, but the discrepancies between the two were so great
as to undermine the possibility of constructing projections
of conventional sales into the future with which to compare
auction results.
All sales data from the Banker and Tradesman publications
acutely suffered from lack of necessary detail. Inevitably,
the legal records from which the publishers obtain their
information do not reflect property-specific data which may
occasionally be subjective but is always relevant in
marketing: location, access, views, and so forth.
Nevertheless, the publishers were able to add quantifiable
data to the record of the transfer, but only intermittently.
This data, when it appeared, would include square footage of
the unit sold, number of bedrooms and baths, etc. Had this
data appeared throughout the record of sales, it might have
been possible to compare the quality of auction sales to the
preceding conventional sales.
The exception to this consistently inadequate data was
the case of the Marina Point Condominiums. The justification
for use of the Marina Point data is that the author personally
visited the previews and open houses prior to the auction,
obtained the marketing materials, interviewed the Realtors as
well as the auction personnel, and attended the auction and
kept detailed records of the proceedings. In all respects the
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author's information has been corroborated by public data, and
where unit-specific data was lacking it was supplied by the
author's homework.
Had reliable sales data been available for the other
projects, particularly the unit-specific data upon which
analysis of the conventional sales effort depends, then a more
viable study of auctions as a market-clearing mechanism might
have been constructed. The confines of such a study would
have been narrowed to auctions of condominiums throughout
Greater Boston during 1989-91. Future auction studies may
need to rely on data gathered through independent research.
C. MARINA POINT CONDOMINIUMS: CONVENTIONAL SALES
Marina Point is a luxury condominium project located
adjacent to a 684-slip marina on the waterfront of North
Quincy, Massachusetts, approximately six miles from downtown
Boston. Opened in 1987, the project gained quick acceptance,
and sales for the first two years of 1987-88 totalled
approximately 170 units. Sales fell off dramatically in 1989
and 1990, the two years prior to the auction, when only 12
units representing 17,924 square feet were sold at an average
price of $178.40 per square foot (see Appendix). At this
sales pace, it would theoretically take 10.56 years to sell
out. Gross, undiscounted cash flow collected over that time
would total $16,882,527.20.
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D. MARINA POINT CONDOMINIUMS: COST OF CARRY
The cash flow collected over time for projects
experiencing long absorption periods must be discounted by the
carrying costs of holding a property. Cost of carry will vary
widely from one property to another. Consequently there is
no one benchmark "cost-of-carry" figure for the industry as
a whole. Nevertheless, the procedure which was used to
develop a "cost-of-carry" for Marina Point offers useful
insight into what carrying costs may approximate for other
REO-type properties.
Under any scenario, a lender begins facing real and
substantial opportunity costs once taking possession of a
property. Currently (July 1991) first mortgages on FNMA-
quality loans are being made on the order of 9 to 10 percent.
For the purposes of the analysis, we will assume an
"opportunity cost" of 10%. Next is the question of just what
cash is tied up in the project. We will assume the net
investment is equal to the current market value of the
project. This value, based upon 1989 and 1990 brokered sales
at Marina Point, would therefore approximate $16,882,527.40
($178.40 sales price per square foot during 1989-90 x 94,633
square feet left in inventory).
In addition, there are other carrying costs which must
be added to the opportunity cost. Those include:
Property management - can receive from 2-1/2% to 5% of
68
gross rental income. If an individual property does not hold
economies of scale the figure tends to the upper end of the
range. For an unoccupied condominium, the property management
costs will reflect projected equivalent gross rent revenues.
Market rents at Marina Point during 1990 hovered in a very
narrow range between $11.80 and $12.20 annually.2 Assuming
$12.00 PSF, the total projected gross rents for a 94,633 SF
inventory would be $1,135,596.00. A five percent fee would
cost the lender $56,779.80 or .00336% of the "going in" asset
value determined above.
Maintainence costs are reflected in condominium fees to
the condominium association. Marina Point fees average $2.96
PSF annually.3 The total fees for the entire inventory of
units would amount to $208,113.68, or 1.659% of asset value.
Insurance costs for REO can be substantial. The Marina
Point project would require higher-priced "dwelling" insurance
policies, rather than homeowner's, and would be assembled in
a commercial package at commercial rates. In addition,
liability coverage for unoccupied units results in additional
premiums over tenanted units. A local insurance agent
familiar with the project estimates insurance premiums in a
range of 1.25% to 1.75% of asset value.4 Assume 1.5% of
$16,882,527.40, or $253,237.91.
Local property taxes will vary widely by location. In
Massachusetts, holders of REO face some of the highest taxes
in the nation. Marina Point is subject to an assessment of
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$24.02 per $1000, or 2.4% of assessed value. The City of
Quincy has 100% valuation, and it is assumed that assessed
valuation is equal to market value. Therefore, property taxes
are 2.4% of the $16,882,527.40 asset value, or $405,180.66
annually.
Asset management includes the cost of administration of
the bank's investment. The cost of maintaining an REO
department will vary from one institution to another. A
former Bank of New England executive has suggested that one
REO officer would handle from five to ten accounts such as
Marina Bay. The cost of the officer's salary and benefits,
support staff, office space, telephone, legal costs associated
with the officer's REO portfolio, are estimated at $250,000
annually. Assuming that Marina Point was one of ten
properties, the asset management cost would be $25,000, or
.00148 percent of the asset value.
As stated, the total carrying cost for REO clearly
depends on a wide variety of property-specific factors, and
further varies from one region, or one institution, to
another. In addition, a lender's out-of-pocket costs can be
dramatically higher if the property needs capital
improvements, which will also raise the net investment basis
in the REO.
In the case of Marina Point, the total annual cost of
holding this project as REO are estimated at 15.57% (see
accompanying table):
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TABLE 1
Foregone opportunity costs.............10.00000%
Property management...................... .00336%
Maintainence............................ 1.65900%
Insurance............................... 1.50000%
Property taxes......................... 2.40200%
Asset management......................... .00148%
Total annual cost of carry..............15.56584%
If a borrower adopted an adversarial posture, it could be
as much as one or two years (or more) before a lender could
foreclose and take physical possession and title to the
property. The carrying costs calculated above do not reflect
deferred maintainence, legal costs, or any other extraordinary
costs which could be incurred before the lender actually obtains
possession. The overall effect of borrower intransigence would
be to further increase indebtedness, perhaps markedly, and to
subject the lender to greater financial exposure.
Asset disposition costs are assumed to be constant for
either conventional brokerage or a comprehensive real estate
auction approach. Auctioneers use marketing costs at 1-2% of
sales price as a benchmark. Marketing costs are paid up front
by the seller. Against this is the cost of running and staffing
a sales office for what is an indefinite, but in all likelihood,
protracted sales campaign. Sales commissions are considered to
be equivalent for brokers or auctioneers.
E. MARINA POINT CONDOMINIUMS: THE AUCTION
Marina Point Condominiums went to auction on November 3,
1990 when the remaining 63 units totalling 94,633 square feet
in aggregate living space were offered under the public minimum
bid method. The auction was one of the most widely publicized
sales of the year in the Greater Boston area. Bid packages were
compiled for prospective buyers which included full information
on the product: construction materials, floor plans, room
dimensions, project amenities, and so on. An attractive
financing package was offered by one of the major local banks.
Minimum bids were established for each unit at approximately 50%
of the most recent appraised value.
On auction day, all sixty-three units were sold at an
average of $121.19 per square foot, a discount of 32.07% per
square foot from the average rate of $178.40 achieved during
conventional sales in the previous two years. Alternatively,
$121.19 PSF at the auction is a 22.88% discount from 1990's
average of $157.15 PSF. Total revenues collected from the
auction were $11,598,000. A unit-by-unit breakdown appears in
the appendix.
F. MARINA POINT: CONVENTIONAL SALES vs. AUCTION RESULTS
In order to compare the auction results to the results of
continuing with the conventional sales campaign, the projected
monthly sales revenues under conventional brokerage was
projected to continue at the 1989 and 1990 pace of 746.84
SF/month until the entire inventory was liquidated, a period of
126.71 months. This cash flow stream was then discounted by the
holding costs of 15.56584% annually as outlined in section D.
The net present value calculated for the projected revenue
stream under conventional brokerage was $8,723,360.83, a
difference of $2,874,639.17, or - 24.79% (see Table 2 at end of
Chapter V).
A common objection to this type of analysis is that the
current sales pace reflects abnormal market conditions. A
lender faced with a decision for an REO auction might consider
holding, confident that more favorable markets would evolve in
which sales pace might improve.
To test the impact of such an occurrence, a sensitivity
analysis incorporating a wide range of possible outcomes was
constructed. Two of the more probable upside conventional sales
cases are discussed below. However, in actual practice a full
range of probable outcomes would be analyzed in detail:
Alternative 1: In this scenario, the slow sales pace
experienced in the 1989-90 market combines with the lack of new
construction in waterfront condominiums to constrict supply.
This could result in an overall improvement in the conventional
sales pace of 30%. At this rate, 970.89 SF per month would
take 97.47 months to sellout. The net present value of this
alternative is $9,689,453.06.
Alternative 2: An optimistic scenario that projects a
sales pace at twice the rate of 1989-90. The diminished supply
of luxury waterfront condominiums combines with lower interest
rates and an increased pace of real economic growth and job
creation to boost absorption dramatically. In this scenario,
the sales pace at Marina Point would double to 1493.68 SF per
month, resulting in 63.35 months to sellout. The net present
value of the optimistic alternative is $11,612,270.29, or about
equal to the auction alternative.
The most pertinent question at this point concerns the
likelihood of each of these alternatives: assigning
probabilities enables us to construct a probability weighted net
present value. Our estimate is that the most optimistic
scenario, calling for a sustained doubling of the sales pace
until sellout, has a one in five probability of occurring.
A moderate upturn of 30% in increased sales from the
depressed levels of 1989-90 is assigned a probability of four
in ten, or .40.
The maintainence of the current rate of sales is also
assigned a probability of .40. This probability may be somewhat
understated by the fact that the most difficult units to sell in
any development are typically left until the end of the sales
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campaign.
The combined probability weighted net present value of
these three alternatives is $9,687,579.61. This is
$1,910,420,39.00 less than the net present value realized at
auction of $11,598,000.00, a difference of - 16.47% (see table
2).
The sensitivity tables which appear in the appendix
categorize scenarios of conventional selling ranging from
optimistic to pessimistic. The weighted probabilities of each
category are accumulated to arrive at a net present value for
each of the three scenarios. The seven optimistic cases project
a NPV of nearly $12.8 million, $1.2 above the auction results.
While the pessimistic cases total $8.64 million, less than $1
million below the baseline NPV of $9.54 million. The
consideration of a spectrum of scenarios indicates that the
auction results placed near the higher end of expected results.
The final table in the appendix illustrates the combined
probability-wieghted net present value of all three conventional
sales scenarios. The optimistic cases are assigned an aggregate
probability of .20, and the baseline and pessimistic cases, .40
each. The final NPV is $9,840,618.8, slightly higher than the
simple baseline case but still substantially below the auction
performance.
The determination of a probability-weighted NPV for various
scenarios of conventional brokered selling, and its comparison
to the NPV of an auction in a depressed market, ignores the
possibility that better market conditions might favor an auction
event as well as it might traditional selling. It might be more
appropriate to compare various conventional sales scenarios to
a variety of auction scenarios. The assumptions that lead to
improved conventional sales results, due to a more favorable
environment, must also be applied to the auction alternative.
This can also be done in the form of a sensitivity table. In
other words, factors such as lower mortgage interest rates, a
healthier local economy, constricted supply of product type,
etc. would logically benefit results of a future auction just as
it would on-site sales by broker. However, since the results
of an actual auction were available, the author felt such a
sensitivity table would be of limited use. A lender who chose
to continue conventional sales over an auction could monitor
auction results of comparable properties as time progressed. In
this way, he or she could easily construct an auction vs.
conventional sensitivity analysis for a specific property at any
point in the market cycle.
TABLE 2
MARINA POINT CONDOMINIUMS
Comparison of Auction Results to Net Present Value of Conventional Sales
Sales $/PSF Absorption Months to $/month NPV2  Prob. 3  Weighted
pace SF/month sellout NPV
Baseline 178.40 746.84 126.71 133,237 8,372,552 .40 3,349,020
+30% 178.40 970.89 97.47 173,206 9,674,856 .40 3,869,942
+100% 178.40 1493.68 63.35 266,472 11,611,762 .20 2,322,352
TOTALS n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.00 9,541,315
Auction 121.19 94633 0 11,598,000 11,598,000 1.00 11,598,000
1 1989-90 sales pace is baseline of 746.84 SF/month;
"+30%" reflects a 30% increase in sales, while
"+100%" is the most optimistic scenario and reflects
a doubling of the baseline sales pace.
2 Discount rate is 15.56584%.
3 Probability of absorption pace being achieved (see text).
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Real estate is often considered the least efficient, and certainly
the least liquid, capital market in the modern world. Attempts
to make real estate more easily tradeable, to reduce transaction
costs, and in general to liquify the market are still in an early
stage.
Auctioneering evolved centuries ago in a wide cross-section
of ancient cultures as a natural response to the challenge of providing
liquidity in all types of markets. The application of auctioneering
techniques to real estate transactions, aside from satisfying the
legal imperatives of judicial sales, is very new.
The novelty of real estate auctions has two immediate meanings.
First, the American auctioneering industry in general is lacking
in sophisticated real estate veterans. In some ways, however,
the demands of the current marketplace are changing this. Secondly,
there is a severe lack of quality data, both historical and contemporary,
upon which needed academic work may proceed. In the real estate
business in general, poor or incomplete data is unfortunately the
rule rather than the exception.
The first recommendation is for both the real estate and financial
community to reconsider old attitudes about auctioneering
techniques. Auctions are often treated as a sales technique of
last resort in the U.S., but indications are that in other capitalist
countries real estate auctions work at least as successfully as
conventional brokerage through all types of markets. An auction
cannot solve the problem of systematically poor real estate: when
a shopping center site is forty miles from water with no curb cut,
or when a vacant office building must compete with ten comparable
buildings for one tenant, an auction cannot be a panacea. Auctions
will only flourish in America when the professional real estate
community loses its fear and prejudice of the technique. Indeed,
the technique may become widespread when American real estate brokers
recognize auctions as an alternative selling technique which can
work in their financial interest. Auctions should begin to take
place throughout the real estate cycle, not just at the trough.
The second recommendation is for the real estate community
to view auctions as a technique of first, rather than last resort,
during healthy markets when the competition for properties is spirited.
Auction techniques regularly set records for high prices during
bull markets in the art world (as in other markets).
The third recommendation is an admonition for more academic
work concerning real estate auctions. If auctions were used
during the speculative frenzy of the 1980s, perhaps prices might
have gone much higher much sooner, and the frothy excesses of
speculation might have been burned off earlier, in one or more
smaller market corrections. Because of the public nature of auction
sales, auctions may come to be viewed as a viable leading indicator
of real estate sales. Veteran auctioneers contend that if a sales
index of real estate auctions could be devised, it would far outperform
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more conventional measures like housing starts in predictive ability.
The fourth recommendation to both the government and
the banking community would be at act expeditiously with repossessed
real estate. The cost of holding empty properties is tremendous.
The liabilities of an equity position in real estate can be complex
and substantial, and best left to those sectors of the economy
which are geared for such risks. The time value of money is centrally,
if not completely, what the banking business is built on. Yet,
for organizational or political reasons, both the federal government
as well as the banking community have reacted to, rather than acted
upon, these issues.
The final recommendation offers the most chance for immediate
benefits. The overhang of REO, both in government and private
hands, is enormous. It poses special marketing problems under
any program of management and disposition. Yet, as was demonstrated
in Chapter V, the costs of holding repossessed real estate are
debilitating. When owners of REO do go to auction, they should
do their best to completely release all information to the buying
public, and to offer the most attractive financing manageable at
all times. Without these two cornerstones of marketing, there
is no auction. What results is a gambling game in which those
who are privy to property-specific information profit at the expense
of the seller and the competition.
APPENDIX
The following appendix contains conventional sales data for
Marina Point condominiums, unit-by-unit results from the auction,
and two sensitivity tables comparing the values of various conventional
sales scenarios.
APPENDIX: DATA ON MARINA POINT CONDOMINIUMS
Conventional Sales Results
1989-90
1989 UNIT PRICE SF PRICE/SF
April 302 216200 1305 165.6704
April 701 600000 1976 303.6437
November 401 327500 1976 165.7388
December 610 208000 922 225.5965
AVG 1989 337925 1544.75 218.7571
1990
April 711 137000 820 167.0731
April 217 136500 922 148.0477
May 512 167000 922 181.1279
May 108 235000 1770 132.7683
May 110 298000 1976 150.8097
July 310 222500 1305 170.4980
November 108 275000 1634 168.2986
November 802 375000 2396 156.5108
AVG 1990 230750 1468.13 157.1727
1989-90
TOTALS 3197700 17924 N/A
AVERAGES 266475 1493.67 178.4029
APPENDIX continued
MARINA POINT CONDOMINIUMS AUCTION 11-3-90
UNIT PRICE SF PRICE/SF
507 230000 1770 129.94
905 160000 1315 121.67
907 151000 1235 122.27
908 150000 1315 114.07
901 355000 2363 150.23
903 465000 2256 206.12
803 385000 2462 156.38
806 144000 1235 116.60
807 136000 1235 110.12
805 160000 1315 121.67
808 139000 1315 105.70
416 116000 922 125.81
704 125000 1100 113.64
706 126000 1100 114.55
604 141000 1100 128.18
903 380000 2256 168.44
607 222000 1770 125.42
604 139000 1100 126.36
610 155000 1290 120.16
611 152000 1235 123.08
612 151000 1235 122.27
608 196000 1634 119.95
85
AUCTION 11-3-90 continuedIMARINA POINT CONDOMINIUMS:
UNIT PRICE SF PRICE/SF
603 205000 1726 118.77
509 159000 1305 121.84
409 166000 1305 127.20
209 164000 1305 125.67
514 157000 1290 121.71
513 147000 1315 111.79
512 146000 1235 118.22
511 156000 1290 120.93
501 239000 1910 125.13
401 237000 1910 124.08
406 127000 1100 115.45
304 128000 1100 116.36
204 124000 1100 112.73
909 110000 760 144.74
807 117000 1235 94.74
712 152000 1315 115.59
711 146000 1235 118.22
710 150000 1235 121.46
701 228000 1910 119.37
601 224000 1910 117.28
508 190000 1634 116.28
505 173000 1452 119.15
503 200000 1726 115.87
UNIT PRICE SF PRICE/SF
408 207000 1634 126.68
407 205000 1770 115.82
405 181000 1452 124.66
307 207000 1770 116.95
305 176000 1452 121.21
301 217000 1910 113.61
208 185000 1634 113.22
207 197000 1770 111.30
205 177000 1452 121.9
201 217000 1910 113.61
203 186000 1726 107.76
106 182000 1770 102.82
101 186000 1910 97.38
606 133000 1100 120.91
707 207000 1770 116.95
703 196000 1726 113.56
103 171000 1726 99.07
613 145000 1290 112.40
TOTALS 11598000 94633 N/A
MEAN 184095.2 1502.111 121.1909
AUCTION 11-3-90 continuedMIARINA POINT CONDOMINIUMS:
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS CONVENTIONAL SELLING SCENARIOS
MARINA POINT CONDOMINIUMS
PRICE/SF MONTHS CASH/MO NPV PROB. WEIGHTED NPVs
OPTIMIST 230 56 388671.25 15404133.2 .05 770206.66
OPTIMIST 220 48 433734.58 15425463.0 .07 1079782.41
OPTIMIST 210 42 473165.00 15247967.3 .09 1372317.06
OPTIMIST 200 36 525738.89 15045722.1 .10 1504572.22 12791244
OPTIMIST 190 48 374588.96 13321990.8 .15 1998298.62
OPTIMIST 180 72 236582.50 11027863.7 .24 2646687.30
OPTIMIST 180 66 258090.00 11397933.7 .30 3419380.09
BASELINE 178.4 126.7 133237.50 8372552.0 .40 3349020.46
BASELINE 178.4 97.5 173206.42 9674856.0 .40 3869942.66 9541315
BASELINE 178.4 63.4 266472.15 11611762.2 .28 2322352.34
PESSIMIST 150 76 186775.66 8992262.2 .25 2517833.41
PESSIMIST 140 66 200736.67 8865059.5 .18 2216264.87
PESSIMIST 130 54 227820.19 8806311.8 .15 1585136.12 8664610
PESSIMIST 120 48 341730.28 9779719.4 .12 1173566.33
PESSIMIST 120 36 473165.00 9704831.2 .09 873434.81
SENSITIVITY TABLE
OPTIMISTIC, BASELINE, AND PESSIMISTIC CASES
CASES NPV PROB. WEIGHTED NPVS AGGREGATE NPV
OPTIMISTIC 12,791,244 .20 2,558,248.8
BASELINE 9,541,315 .40 3,816,526.0 9,840,618.8
PESSIMISTIC 8,664,610 .40 3,465,844.0
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